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ABSTRACT 
 
Using data on the firms' voluntary disclosures from the Korea Stock Exchange from 2011 to 2014, we first empirically 
examine the association between voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry and then investigate the extent to 
which this association is affected by accruals quality since Korea adopted International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) in 2011.   
 
We use Comprix et al. (2011) and Shin and Park (2014)'s measures of information asymmetry. They are daily stock 
return volatility (VOLA) and trading volume turnover (VOL). We use the Dechow et al.'s (1995) revised Jones model 
and the Kothari et al.'s (2005) performance matched discretionary accrual model to measure the discretionary 
accruals. The absolute values of discretionay accruals are used as proxies for accruals quality. Final research 
samples with voluntary disclosure for this study are 1,226 (firms-years) companies.  
 
The research findings generally support our hypotheses. First, the relation between voluntary disclosure and 
information asymmetry is statistically and significantly positive as we have expected. The Korean companies with 
high voluntary disclosure would experience higher daily stock return volatility and less trading volume, which implies 
that companies tend to disclose biased information to the outside, which is consistent with prior studies in Korea. 
Second, the accruals quality (moderating variable) on the relation between voluntary disclosure and information 
asymmetry is statistically and significantly negative. Thus, we can conclude that when accruals quality is high, more 
voluntary disclosure decreases information asymmetry. These findings imply that accruals quality works as a 
mechanism in reducing the negative effect of voluntary disclosure on information asymmetry after the adoption of 
IFRS in Korea.  
 
The limitation of this study is such that we might not have considered other omitted variables and other proxies for 
the accruals quality, voluntary disclosure, and information asymmetry. 
 
Keywords: Accruals Quality; Voluntary Disclosure; Information Asymmetry  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
e empirically examine the effect of accruals quality on the association between voluntary disclosure 
(VD) and the information asymmetry since South Korea adopted the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2011. Korean-adopted IFRS (K-IFRS) does not provide detailed 
accounting guidelines on the preparation of financial statements since IFRS is principle-based rather than rule-based. 
Thus, it is generally anticipated that managerial discretion which causes accruals volatility to be too high or too low 
relative to industry norms will increase information asymmetry between managers and investors (and/or among 
investors). The existence of information asymmetry in the capital market could affect the efficient allocation of scarce 
economic resources, causing the problem of adverse selection, and potentially induce the market failure.  
 
After the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, Korea revamped its financial reporting systems and introduced the 
fair disclosure regulations in order to improve the accounting transparency and mitigate the problem of information 
W 
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asymmetry. The disclosure requirement can work as a remedy in reducing the information asymmetry. However, 
investors and regulators have doubted the credibility of voluntary disclosure. To protect the investors and enhance the 
credibility of voluntary disclosure, the Korean government enacted a rule to incorporate voluntary disclosure into its 
regulation system in April, 2000. Since then, the government has further encouraged firms to expand the voluntary 
disclosure, hoping that it could enhance the relevance of accounting information and as a result, reduce information 
asymmetry in the market. 
 
Prior studies provide conflicting results on the role of voluntary disclosure on the information asymmetry in Korea. 
Cho and Jo (2010) prove that the quarterly reports initiated in 2000 reduced information asymmetry in Korea. 
However, Sohn et al. (2008) report that the frequency of the voluntary disclosure increased the analysts' earnings 
forecasts error and bias. Shin and Lee (2014) also argue that voluntary disclosure increased the information asymmetry 
in Korea. These results indicate that unlike the government's intention, it is possible for firms to provide favorable and 
biased information through the system, losing the credibility of information. Thus, whether a positive relation between 
voluntary disclosure and the information asymmetry still holds since Korea adopted IFRS in 2011 is an empirical 
question to be tested. Accordingly, following Sohn et al. (2008) and Shin and Lee (2014), we hypothesize that Korean 
firms with high voluntary disclosure would experience higher daily stock return volatility and less trading volume 
turnover. 
 
A firm's accruals is defined as the difference between reported earnings and cash flows from operations. High accruals 
quality mitigates information risks of the firm about future cash flows and earnings by reducing information 
asymmetry between firms and the market participants. Market participants will ask for an additional premium as a 
consideration for poor accruals quality, which means higher information risk. It is expected that because accounting 
accruals are a comprehensive measure of all accounting choices made by management, they are likely to capture 
earnings management (Watts and Zimmerman 1990). The availability of discretionary reporting choices may erode 
the information content of earnings (Cormier and Magnan 2002; Oh et al. 2016). Accordingly, we expect that the 
better accruals quality firms have, the less information asymmetry. Cho and Jo (2010) investigate the effect of accruals 
quality on the firms' information asymmetry and find that firms with less volatility of accruals enjoy less daily stock 
return volatility and higher trading volume turnover. However, the effect of accruals quality on the relations between 
voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry has not yet been studied in Korea. Thus, we test whether accruals 
quality mitigates the relation between voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry.  
 
The research findings generally support our hypotheses. First, the relation between voluntary disclosure and 
information asymmetry is statistically and significantly positive. Second, the interaction variable on the relation 
between voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry is statistically and significantly negative. Thus, we can 
conclude that the effect of voluntary disclosure and accruals quality on information asymmetry decreases for firms 
with high accruals quality. When accruals quality is high, more voluntary disclosure decreases information 
asymmetry. These findings imply that accruals quality works as a mechanism in reducing the negative effect of 
voluntary disclosure on information asymmetry after the adoption of IFRS in Korea by providing firm's information 
to the market. This study provides evidence that high accruals quality, when combined with voluntary disclosure, 
reduces information asymmetry and thus contributes to the enhancement and usefulness of the voluntary disclosure 
information.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews prior literature and develops the research hypothesis. 
Section III presents the research design. Section IV reports the empirical results. Section V sets forth the conclusion. 
 
2. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Voluntary Disclosure and Information Asymmetry  
 
Generally voluntary disclosures are expected to decrease information between managers and investor (and / or among 
investors) (Francis et al. 2008; Sohn et al. 2008). However, investors and regulators have a question about the 
reliability of voluntary disclosures. The Korean government enacted a rule to incorporate voluntary disclosures, into 
a part of its regulation system in March, 2000, as a device of timely disclosures ruled by Financial Supervisory Service 
(FSS) and Korea Exchange (KRX), and the government has been encourage firms to voluntary disclosure their private 
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information through its regulation system(Sohn et al. 2008). Meanwhile, a variety of prior literatures have examined 
the effect of voluntary disclosure introduction on information asymmetry since 2000 in Korea. But, study examined 
the effect voluntary disclosure on information asymmetry after adoption of K-IFRS is scare. This study investigated 
the effect voluntary disclosure on information asymmetry after adoption of K-IFRS. 
 
Before adoption of K-IFRS, Prior literature shows mixed evidence on the relation between voluntary disclosure and 
information asymmetry. Lee and Shin (2010), unlike Francis and Nanda (2008), argue that firms with more expansive 
voluntary disclosure are associated with lower cost of capital when controlled for accruals quality and try to reduce 
the information asymmetry through expansive voluntary disclosures. However, Sohn et al. (2008) and Shin and Lee 
(2014) show that the frequency of the voluntary disclosure is significantly and positively related to the information 
asymmetry. Thus, following Sohn et al. (2008) and Shin and Lee (2014), we predict that Korean firms with high 
voluntary disclosure would experience higher daily stock return volatility and less trading volume turnover and 
hypothesize as follows:  
 
H1: There is a positive association between voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry after adoption of K-
IFRS.  
 
H2: There is a positive association between voluntary disclosure frequency and information asymmetry after adoption 
of K-IFRS.  
 
2.2 Accruals Quality, Voluntary Disclosure, and Information Asymmetry  
 
Previous empirical evidence supports a negative correlation between high accruals quality (including accruals quality) 
and low information asymmetry. (Ecker et al. 2006; Rajgopal and Venkatachalam 2006; Cho and Jo 2010) Thus, better 
accruals quality firms have, the less information asymmetry. However, whether accruals quality mitigates the positive 
association between voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry has not yet been investigated. Thus, we 
hypothesize as follows:  
 
H3: The accruals quality has a moderating effect on the negative relationship between voluntary disclosure and 
information asymmetry after adoption of K-IFRS. 
 
H4: The accruals quality has a moderating effect on the negative relationship between voluntary disclosure frequency 
and information asymmetry after adoption of K-IFRS. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1 Regression Models 
 
To test Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, we use a multivariate regression model to investigate whether the voluntary disclosure 
(voluntary disclosure frequency) increases information asymmetry as we have expected. The voluntary disclosure and voluntary 
disclosure frequency are used as proxies for the voluntary disclosure and VOLA (daily stock return volatility) and VOL (trading 
volume turnover) for information asymmetry for equations (1) and (2). Regression models are as follows; 
 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴%& = 	𝛽* + 𝛽,𝑉𝐷%&	 𝑜𝑟	𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸%& + 𝛽9𝐿𝐸𝑉%& + 𝛽:𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴%& + 𝛽<𝑉𝑂𝐿%& + 𝛽=𝐹𝑂𝑅%& + 𝜀%&																																			 (1) 
 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴%& = 	𝛽* + 𝛽,𝑉𝐷%&	 𝑜𝑟	𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸%& + 𝛽9𝐿𝐸𝑉%& + 𝛽:𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴%& + 𝛽<𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴%& + 𝛽=𝐹𝑂𝑅%& + 𝜀%&		 (2) 
 
To test Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4, we use a multivariate regression model to investigate whether accruals quality has a 
moderating effect on the positive relationship between voluntary disclosure (or voluntary disclosure frequency) and information 
asymmetry. To estimate the accruals quality, We use the Dechow et al.'s (1995) modified Jones model and the Kothari et 
al.'s (2005) performance matched discretionary accrual model to measure the discretionary accruals. The absolute 
values of discretionary accruals are used as proxies for accruals quality. Regression models are as follows; 
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𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴%& = 	 	𝛽* + 𝛽,𝑉𝐷%&	 𝑜𝑟	𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑄_𝐷𝑈𝑀%& + 𝛽9𝑉𝐷	 	𝑜𝑟	𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇 %&✕	𝐴𝑄_𝐷𝑈𝑀%& +𝛽:𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸%& + 𝛽<𝐿𝐸𝑉%& + 𝛽=𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴%& + 𝛽D𝑉𝑂𝐿%& + 𝛽E𝐹𝑂𝑅%& + 𝜀%&																			 (3) 
 𝑉𝑂𝐿%& = 	 	𝛽* + 𝛽,𝑉𝐷%&	 𝑜𝑟	𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑄FGH%& + 𝛽9𝑉𝐷	 	𝑜𝑟	𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇 %&✕	𝐴𝑄FGH%& + 𝛽:𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸%& + 𝛽<𝐿𝐸𝑉%& + 𝛽=𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴%& + 𝛽D𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴%& + 𝛽E𝐹𝑂𝑅%& + 𝜀%&																						 (4) 
 
Variable Definitions: 
 
VOLAit : the standard deviation of daily stock returns for firm i over the one-year period from the second quarter of year t to 
the first quarter of year t+1;  
 
VOLit: the mean daily trading volume scaled by shares outstanding for firm i over the one-year period from the second quarter 
of year t to the first quarter of year t+1; 
 
VDit : an indicator variable equal to one if the firm issues at least one voluntary disclosure in a given year, 0 otherwise;  
 
COUNTit : voluntary disclosure frequency; 
 
AQ_DUMit : accruals quality indicator variable;  
 
AQ1_DUMit : an indicator variable equals to 1 if the firm has less than the absolute values of residuals according to the modified 
Jones model (1995), 0 otherwise ; 
 
AQ2_DUMit : an indicator variable equals to 1 if the firm has less than the absolute values of residuals according to the 
performance matched Kothari model (2005), 0 otherwise ; 
 
VDit *AQ_DUMit : interaction variable between voluntary disclosure indicator variable and accruals quality indicator variable; 
 
COUNTit *AQ_DUMit : interaction variable between voluntary disclosure frequency variable and accruals quality indicator 
variable; 
 
SIZEit : the natural log of total assets for firm i in year t; 
 
LEVit : total liabilities deflated by total assets; 
 
BETAit: systematic risk, estimated value using monthly stock returns for firm i over the five years period from year t to year t-
4; 
 
FORit : foreign ownership; 
 𝜀%&= residuals, the estimated error in the model  
 
VD is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm issues at least one voluntary disclosure in a given year, 0 otherwise. COUNT 
presents voluntary disclosure frequency for firms with voluntary disclosure data. We predict a positive (+) association between 
VD ( or COUNT ) and information asymmetry. AQ_DUM is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has less than the 
absolute values of residuals , 0 otherwise. We predict a negative (-) association between AQ_DUM and information asymmetry. 
Control variables are SIZE, LEV, BETA, FOR. 
 
SIZE is the natural log of total assets for firm i in year t. Size is added to control firm size effect and omitted variables effect 
(Francis et al. 2005). We predict a negative (-) association between SIZE and information asymmetry because information 
environment for firms with bigger size is rich.  
 
LEV is total liabilities deflated by total assets. If LEV is high, firms will be reluctant to disclose information. We predict a 
positive (+) association between LEV and information asymmetry (Cho and Jo 2010). 
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BETA is systematic risk, estimated by using monthly stock returns for firm i over the five years period from year t to year t-4. 
Firms with bigger systematic risk will be reluctant to disclose information. Therefore, We predict a positive (+) association 
between BETA and information asymmetry (Botosan 1997). 
 
FOR is foreign ownership. Prior literature indicates that foreign investors have played an important role in improving the 
information asymmetry (Ahn et al. 2005; Cho and Jo 2010). We predict a negative (-) association between FOR and information 
asymmetry. 
 
3.2 Measure of Variables 
 
3.2.1 Information Asymmetry 
 
A dependent variable is the information asymmetry. We use VOLA and VOL as proxies for information asymmetry (Lang and 
Lundholm 1993; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; Shin and Park 2014). VOLA means standard deviation of daily stock returns for 
firm i over the one-year period from the second quarter of year t to the first quarter of year t+1. Higher standard deviation of 
daily stock returns shows that information asymmetry between investors and firms is bigger (Cho and Jo 2010). Thus, we expect 
a positive association with voluntary disclosure. 
 
The VOL means the mean daily trading volume scaled by shares outstanding for firm i over the one-year period from the second 
quarter of year t to the first quarter of year t+1. Trading volume turnover presents the market liquidity of stocks for firms. Market 
liquidity indicates the intention to make a deal to the capital market, where higher daily trading volume shows that there are 
many investors who want to trade stocks in the capital market (Glosten and Milgrom 1985; Cho and Jo 2010). Thus, the 
intention to trade stocks and information asymmetry have an inverse relationship. 
 
3.2.2 Accruals Quality  
 
3.2.2.1 Dechow et al. (1995)'s Modified Jones Model 
 
The first measure is discretionary accruals as developed by Dechow et al.'s (1995) modified Jones model. Specifically, we 
estimate the following model by year and for each industry that has at least 10 observations: We use the absolute values of 
discretionary accruals ( AM ) as a proxy for accruals quality. Thus, higher values represent lower accruals quality. 
 KLMNOLNOPQ = 	 a* ,LNOPQ  + a, ∆TUVNOW	∆LTNO	LNOPQ  + a4 XXUNOLNOPQ  + 𝜀%&   (5) 
 AM = KLMNOLNOPQ 	− 	 		a* ,LNOPQ 	+ 	 		a, ∆TUVNOW	∆LTNO	LNOPQ 	+ 	 		a4 XXUNOLNOPQ 		 																												 (6) 
 
In this model,  
 AM : absolute values of residuals measured by Dechow et al.'s (1995) revised Jones model;  
 TAC\]: total accruals, measured as the change in non-cash current assets minus the change in current non-interest-bearing 
liabilities, minus depreciation and amortization expenses for firm i at year t; 
 ∆REV\]: changes in sales revenue for firm i in year t; 
 ∆AR\]: changes in receivables for firm i in year t; 
 PPE\]: gross sum of property, plant, and equipment for firm i in year t; 
 A\]W,: total assets for firm i in year t-1; 
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3.2.2.2 Kothari et al. (2005) model 
 
The second measure is performance-adjusted discretionary accruals as developed by Kothari et al. (2005). Specifically, we 
estimate the following model by year and for each industry that has at least 10 observations: We use the absolute values of 
discretionary accruals as a proxy for accruals quality ( AM_ROA ). Thus, greater the absolute size of the residual ( AM_ROA ), 
greater the discretionary accruals, the lower the accruals quality.  
 KLMNOLNOPQ = 	 a* ,LNOPQ  + a, ∆TUVNOW	∆LTNO	LNOPQ  + a4 XXUNOLNOPQ  + a9ROA\]	+ 𝜀%&   (7) 
 AM_ROA = KLMNOLNOPQ 	− 	 		a* ,LNOPQ 	+ 	 		a, ∆TUVNOW	∆LTNO	LNOPQ 	+ 	 		a4 XXUNOLNOPQ + +			a9 ROA\] 		 	  (8) 
 
In this model,  
 AM_ROA : absolute values of residuals measured by Kothari et al. (2005);  
 TAC\]: total accruals, measured as the change in non-cash current assets minus the change in current non-interest-bearing 
liabilities, minus depreciation and amortization expenses for firm i at year t; 
 ∆REV\]: changes in sales revenue for firm i in year t; 
 ∆AR\]: changes in receivables for firm i in year t; 
 PPE\]: gross sum of property, plant, and equipment for firm i in year t; 
 ROA\]: pretax income for firm i in year t scaled by prior year total assets; 
 A\]W,: total assets for firm i in year t-1; 
 
3.3 Sample Selection 
 
We employ the data collected from 2011 to 2014 from the Korean stock market. The sample selection process is summarized 
in Table 1. We first eliminate the quoted non-financial December firms for which financial and stock data cannot be collected 
from FN-Guide. Those companies whose year-ends are not on December 31 are excluded because of data homogeneity. 
Financial firms are also eliminated since the nature of the business is different from our sample. The final sample for model 1 
and model 2 is 2,584 firm-year observations. Additionally, we exclude firms for which voluntary disclosure data cannot be 
collected. The final sample for the Model (3) and Model (4) consists of 1,226 firm-year observations. We winsorize each of the 
continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to minimize the effect of outliers. Panel A of Table 2 shows the distribution 
across fiscal years in our sample. Panel B of Table 2 shows the distribution by industry in our sample. Panel C of Table 2 show 
the items of voluntary disclosure. 
 
 
Table 1. Sample selection 
Criteria Firm-Year Observations 
Quoted non-financial December 31 firms for fiscal years 2011-2014 2,627 
(less) Firms for which financial and stock data cannot be collected from FN-Guide (43) 
Total (sample for Hypothesis 1, 2)  2,584 
(less) Firms for which voluntary disclosure data cannot be collected (1,358) 
Total (sample for Hypothesis 3, 4) 1,226 
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Table 2. Distributions of voluntary disclosure over the sample period 
Panel A. Distribution across fiscal years 
Year N Firms with disclosure data (%) 
Firms without 
disclosure data (%) 
2011 638 342 53.61 296 43.39 
2012 642 273 42.52 369 57.48 
2013 649 307 47.03 342 52.7 
2014 655 304 46.41 351 53.59 
Total 2584 1226 47.45 1358 52.55 
Panel B. Industry distribution  
Industry N Firms with disclosure data (%) 
Firms without 
disclosure data (%) 
Food, Beverage 140 50 35.71 90 64.29 
Fiber, Clothes, Leathers 101 28 27.72 73 72.28 
Timber, Pulp, Furniture 112 40 35.71 72 64.29 
Cokes, Chemical 274 110 40.15 164 59.85 
Medical Manufacturing 132 63 47.73 69 52.27 
Rubber & Plastic 74 27 36.49 47 63.51 
Non Metallic 78 36 46.15 42 53.85 
Metallic 204 78 38.24 126 61.76 
Pc, Medical 164 83 50.61 81 49.39 
Machine & Electronic  184 102 55.43 82 44.57 
Other Transportation 178 91 51.12 87 48.88 
Construction 124 114 91.94 10 8.06 
Retail  & Whole Sales 229 96 41.92 133 58.08 
Transportation Service 84 46 54.76 38 45.24 
Publishing, Broadcating 50 21 42 29 58 
Professional Services 236 121 51.27 115 48.73 
Other 220 120 54.55 100 45.45 
Total 2584 1226 47.45 1358 52.55 
 
Panel C. Disclosure items 
Items N Ratio(%) 
Other major management issues 2,294 45.8 
Single sale and supply agreement  776 15.5 
Patent Acquisition 499 10.0 
Other corporate investment and disposal 291 5.8 
Affiliated companies change 245 4.9 
Seasoned equity offerings (seo) and Equity-related bonds  180 3.6 
Green Information Management  147 2.9 
Salse and Income structure change  88 1.8 
Greenhouse Gases and energy 71 1.4 
Tangible assets acquired / disposed of  53 1.1 
Technology Introduction  43 0.9 
Family Friendly  39 0.8 
Lawsuit 33 0.7 
Embezzlement and misappropriation 32 0.6 
Infrastructure Investment  31 0.6 
Sustainable management report 28 0.6 
Loan guarantees 23 0.5 
Single sale and supply cancellation 18 0.4 
Mutual savings bank 15 0.3 
Short-term loan  13 0.3 
(Panel C continued on next page) 
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Panel C. continued 
Items N Ratio(%) 
Money rentals 9 0.2 
Resource Development 9 0.2 
Asset revaluation  8 0.2 
Receipt 7 0.1 
Major shareholders change 7 0.1 
Other 51 1.0 
Total 5,010 100 
 
 
4. EMPRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A of Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the full sample. The mean (median) of standard deviation of daily stock 
returns (VOLA) is 2.617 (2.402). The mean (median) value of mean daily trading volume (VOL) is 2.179 (1.047). In Korea, 
47.4% of firms listed on the KSE issue voluntary disclosure. The mean of absolute value of residuals measured by Dechow et 
al. (1995) is 0.054 (AQ1). The mean of absolute values of residuals measured by Kothari et al. (2005) is 0.054 (AQ2). The 
average size is 26.825. The mean leverage (LEV) is 43.7%. The mean BETA and foreign ownership are 0.887 and 9.486% 
respectively. 
 
Panel B of Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for firms that shows the frequency of voluntary disclosures. LEV, SIZE, and 
BETA are normaly distributed. The mean (median) standard deviation of daily stock returns (VOLA) is 2.733 (2.513). The 
mean (median) value of mean daily trading volume (VOL) is 2.077 (1.127). The mean frequency of voluntary disclosure is 3.1, 
implying that firms issue voluntary disclosure at least 3 times a year. The mean of absolute values of residuals measured by 
Dechow et al. (1995) is 0.056 (AQ1) and that measured by Kothari et al. (2005) is 0.055 (AQ2). The average size is 27.196. 
The mean leverage (LEV) is 47.4%. The mean BETA and foreign ownership are 0.974 and 11.159% respectively. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A. Full samples (N=2,584) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min 25th pecentile Median 
75th 
pecentile Max 
VOLA 2.617 1.062 0.984 1.870 2.402 3.159 6.178 
VOL 2.179 4.466 0.000 0.000 1.047 2.298 30.057 
VD 0.474 0.499 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
AQ1 0.054 0.046 0.000 0.015 0.038 0.088 0.134 
AQ2 0.054 0.045 0.000 0.015 0.040 0.087 0.130 
SIZE 26.825 1.498 23.914 25.827 26.607 27.617 30.996 
LEV 0.437 0.212 0.017 0.271 0.435 0.586 0.960 
BETA 0.887 0.538 -0.200 0.553 0.890 1.240 2.248 
FOR 9.486 13.079 0.000 0.765 3.581 13.338 60.095 
Panel B. Firm samples with voluntary disclosure data (N=1,226) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min 25th pecentile Median 
75th 
pecentile Max 
VOLA 2.733 0.974 1.331 1.983 2.513 3.343 4.839 
VOL 2.077 2.369 0.127 0.600 1.127 2.398 9.228 
COUNT 3.104 2.769 1.000 1.000 2.000 4.000 11.000 
AQ1 0.056 0.046 0.000 0.016 0.040 0.092 0.134 
AQ2 0.055 0.045 0.000 0.016 0.041 0.089 0.130 
SIZE 27.196 1.534 24.635 26.042 26.979 28.353 29.867 
LEV 0.474 0.201 0.103 0.316 0.486 0.624 0.803 
BETA 0.974 0.477 0.176 0.623 0.971 1.340 1.795 
FOR 11.159 14.642 0.000 0.935 4.946 16.190 89.733 
 
Variable Definitions: 
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VOLAit: the standard deviation of daily stock returns for firm i over the one-year period from the second quarter of year t to 
the first quarter of year t+1;  
 
VOLit: the mean daily trading volume scaled by shares outstanding for firm i over the one-year period from the second quarter 
of year t to the first quarter of year t+1; 
 
VDit: an indicator variable equal to one if the firm issues at least one voluntary disclosure in a given year, 0 otherwise;  
 
COUNTit: voluntary disclosure frequency; 
 
AQ_DUMit: accruals quality indicator variable;  
 
AQ1_DUMit: an indicator variable equals to 1 if the firm has less than the absolute values of residuals according to the modified 
Jones model (1995), 0 otherwise; 
 
AQ2_DUMit: an indicator variable equals to 1 if the firm has less than the absolute values of residuals according to the 
performance matched Kothari model (2005), 0 otherwise; 
 
VDit *AQ_DUMit : interaction variable between voluntary disclosure indicator variable and accruals quality indicator variable; 
 
COUNTit *AQ_DUMit: interaction variable between voluntary disclosure frequency variable and accruals quality indicator 
variable; 
 
SIZEit: the natural log of total assets for firm i in year t; 
 
LEVit: total liabilities deflated by total assets; 
 
BETAit: systematic risk, estimated value using monthly stock returns for firm i over the five years period from year t to year t-
4; 
 
FORit: foreign ownership; 
 
4.2 Correlation Analysis 
 
Panel A of Table 4 presents pearson correlations. VOLA is significantly and positively (+) correlated with VD, LEV, and 
BETA. This means voluntary disclosure, higher debt ratio, and higher risk make larger the standard deviation of daily stock 
returns. Thus, voluntary disclosure increases information asymmetry. VD is significantly and positively (+) correlated with 
VOL. This means voluntary disclosure makes larger the mean daily trading volume. AQ1 and AQ2 are significantly and 
negatively (-) correlated with VOLA and VOL. This shows that the standard deviation of daily stock returns decreases for firms 
with better accruals quality and the mean daily trading volume increases for firms with better accruals quality.  
 
Panel B of Table 4 presents pearson correlations for firms with voluntary disclosure data. COUNT (voluntary disclosure 
frequency) is significantly and positively (+) correlated with VOLA. This means voluntary disclosure frequency makes larger 
the standard deviation of daily stock returns. Thus, voluntary disclosure frequency increases information asymmetry. COUNT 
is not significantly and positively (+) correlated with VOL. AQ1 and AQ2 are significantly and negatively (-) correlated with 
VOLA and VOL. This explains that the standard deviation of daily stock returns decreases for firms with higher accruals 
quality, the mean daily trading volume increases for firms with higher accruals quality.  
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Table 4. Pearson Correlations 
Panel A. Full samples (N=2,584)  
 VOLA VOL VD AQ1 AQ2 SIZE LEV BETA 
VOL 0.732***         
VD 0.131***  0.047**        
AQ1 -0.117***  -0.099***  -0.029      
AQ2 -0.093***  -0.060***  -0.031 0.821***      
SIZE -0.287***  -0.330***  0.263***  0.153***  0.131***     
LEV 0.231 *** 0.139***  0.184***  -0.108***  -0.116***  0.187***    
BETA 0.174 *** 0.111***  0.144***  0.036*  0.040**  0.158***  0.229***   
FOR -0.207***  -0.194***  0.106***  0.101***  0.069***  0.458***  -0.150***  -0.071***  
Panel B. Firm samples with voluntary disclosure data (N=1,226) 
 VOLA VOL COUNT AQ1 AQ2 SIZE LEV BETA 
VOL 0.726***         
COUNT 0.104***  0.030       
AQ1 -0.145***  -0.105***  -0.069**       
AQ2 -0.138***  -0.067***  -0.069***  0.790***      
SIZE -0.393***  -0.386***  0.095***  0.182***  0.162***     
LEV 0.241***  0.143***  0.205***  -0.094***  -0.120***  0.164***    
BETA 0.166***  0.085***  0.088***  0.050***  0.051***  0.204***  0.254***  
FOR -0.306***  -0.263***  0.013 0.131***  0.105***  0.511***  -0.184***  -0.089***  
1) Please refer to Table 3 for variable definitions. 
2) ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
4.3 Multivariate Results 
 
Using models (1) and (2), we perform multivariate regression analyses to test whether voluntary disclosure is associated with 
information asymmetry. In Table 5, coefficients (β,) on VOLA and VOL are 0.265 and -0.298, significantly positive (+) at 1% 
and significantly negative (-) at 5% respectively. Consistent with previous studies (Sohn et al. 2008; Shin and Lee 2014; Jung 
2015), voluntary disclosure rather increases information asymmetry, confirming Hypothesis 1. The result shows that firms with 
voluntary disclosure have larger return variability and less share turnover, implying that firms tend to disclose favorable and 
biased information to the outside. Thus, the risk of information from the uncertainty of business will be high and the information 
asymmetry will increase.  
 
In Table 6, only the coefficient (β,) on VOLA is significantly positive (+) at 1%, partially supporting Hypothesis 2. The results 
for the control variables are generally consistent with our expectations. The coefficients of SIZE in the models (1) and (2) are 
significantly negative as expected. The coefficients on LEV and BETA in the model (1) are significantly positive at 1% 
respectively as expected. These results are consistent with Cho and Jo (2010), Shin and Park (2014) and Oh and Shin (2016).  
 
Across models, R4	values range from approximately 46.14 to 58.27 percent. Additionally, the F-statistic is significant, 
suggesting that our use of the regression model is appropriate. 
 
  
The Journal of Applied Business Research – January/February 2017 Volume 33, Number 1 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 233 The Clute Institute 
Table 5. The effect of voluntary disclosure on information asymmetry (H1) 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴%& = 	 	𝛽* + 𝛽,𝑉𝐷%&	 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸%& + 𝛽9𝐿𝐸𝑉%& + 𝛽:𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴%& + 𝛽<𝑉𝑂𝐿%& + 𝛽=𝐹𝑂𝑅%& + 𝜀%&			 (1) 𝑉𝑂𝐿%& = 	 	𝛽* + 𝛽,𝑉𝐷%&	 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸%& + 𝛽9𝐿𝐸𝑉%& + 𝛽:𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴%& + 𝛽<𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴%& + 𝛽=𝐹𝑂𝑅%& + 𝜀%&	 (2) 
Variables Predicted Sign 
Dependent Variable VOLA Predicted 
Sign 
Dependent Variable VOL 
Coefficient t-value p-value Coefficient t-value p-value 
INTERCEPT  5.529***  17.53 <.0001  2.487*  1.68 0.0939 
VD (+) 0.265***   8.66 <.0001 (-) -0.298**  -2.16 0.0307 
SIZE (-) -0.144***   -11.63 <.0001 (+) -0.272***   -4.85 <.0001 
LEV (+) 0.807***   10.8 <.0001 (+) -0.198 -0.58 0.5603 
BETA (+) 0.177***   6.29 <.0001 (-) -0.002 -0.01 0.9885 
VOL (+) 0.139***   39.95 <.0001     
VOLA     (+) 2.751***   39.95 <.0001 
FOR (-) 0.001 0.66 0.5087 (+) 0.003 0.46 0.6452 
F-VALUE  464.23***  369.81*** 
ADJ R-SQ  51.83%  46.14% 
1) Please refer to Table 3 for variable definitions. 
2) ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
 
Table 6. The effect of voluntary disclosure frequency on information asymmetry (H2) 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴%& = 	 	𝛽* + 𝛽,𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇%&	 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸%& + 𝛽9𝐿𝐸𝑉%& + 𝛽:𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴%& + 𝛽<𝑉𝑂𝐿%& + 𝛽=𝐹𝑂𝑅%& + 𝜀%&			 (1) 𝑉𝑂𝐿%& = 	 	𝛽* + 𝛽,𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇%&	 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸%& + 𝛽9𝐿𝐸𝑉%& + 𝛽:𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴%& + 𝛽<𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴%& + 𝛽=𝐹𝑂𝑅%& + 𝜀%&		 (2) 
Variables Predicted Sign 
Dependent Variable VOLA Predicted 
Sign 
Dependent Variable VOL 
Coefficient t-value p-value Coefficient t-value p-value 
INTERCEPT  5.045***  12.290 <.0001  2.720**  2.430 0.015 
COUNT (+) 0.024***  3.560 0.000 (-) -0.027 -1.580 0.114 
SIZE (-) -0.127***  -7.960 <.0001 (+) -0.190***  -4.550 <.0001 
LEV (+) 0.683***  6.820 <.0001 (+) 0.091 0.350 0.729 
BETA (+) 0.234***  5.780 <.0001 (-) -0.015 -0.140 0.885 
VOL (+) 0.252***  29.580 <.0001     
VOLA     (+) 1.667 *** 29.580 <.0001 
FOR (-) 0.001 -0.310 0.755 (+) 0.002 0.410 0.683 
F-VALUE  284.5***   235.67***  
ADJ R-SQ  58.27%  53.62% 
1) Please refer to Table 3 for variable definitions. 
2) ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
In Table 7, the effect of accruals quality on the relationship between voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry is 
significantly negative (-) for VOLA. The coefficients (β9) on the interaction variables (VD*AQ1_DUM and VD*AQ2_DUM) 
are -0.098 and -0.146, significantly negative (-) at 5% and 1% respectively, implying that investors respond differently to 
voluntary disclosure with accruals quality.  
 
Only VOL is significantly positive when accruals quality is measured by the Kothari model (2005). The coefficient (β9) on the 
interaction variable (VD*AQ2_DUM) is significantly positive (+) at 5%, implying that with high accruals quality, more 
voluntary disclosure lowers information asymmetry. Thus, accruals quality has a moderating effect on the relationship between 
voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry, confirming our hypothesis 3. 
 
In Table 8, the effect of accruals quality on the relationship between voluntary disclosure frequency and information asymmetry 
shows a significantly positive (+) relationship for VOL only. The coefficients (β9) on VD*AQ1_DUM and VD*AQ2_DUM) 
are 0.044 and 0.065, significantly positive (+) at 1% and 5% respectively, implyings that high accruals quality lowers the 
intensity of the relationship between voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry. Overall, Hypothesis 4 is partially 
confirmed.  
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Table 7. The effect of accruals quality on the association between voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry (H3) 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴%& = 	 	𝛽* + 𝛽,𝑉𝐷%&	 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑄FGH%& + 𝛽9𝑉𝐷	%&✕	𝐴𝑄FGH%& + 𝛽:𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸%& + 𝛽<𝐿𝐸𝑉%& + 𝛽=𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴%& + 𝛽D𝑉𝑂𝐿%& +𝛽E𝐹𝑂𝑅%& + 𝜀%&			 (3) 𝑉𝑂𝐿%& = 	 	𝛽* + 𝛽,𝑉𝐷%&	 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑄FGH%& + 𝛽9𝑉𝐷%&✕𝐴𝑄FGH%& + 𝛽:𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸%& + 𝛽<𝐿𝐸𝑉%& + 𝛽=𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴%& + 𝛽D𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴%& +𝛽E𝐹𝑂𝑅%& + 𝜀%&				 (4) 
Variables Predicted Sign 
Dependent Variable VOLA Predicted 
Sign 
Dependent Variable VOL 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
INTERCEPT  3.780***  12.750 3.742***  12.630  3.856***  5.040 3.969***  5.190 
VD (+) 0.252***  6.340 0.280***  7.070 (-) -0.150 -1.490 -0.191*  -1.900 
AQ1_DUM  0.009 0.240    -0.056 -0.640   
VD*AQ1_DUM (-) -0.098**  -1.950   (+) 0.142 1.120   
AQ2_DUM    0.022 0.640    0.009 0.100 
VD*AQ2_DUM (-)   -0.146***  -2.900 (+)   0.220**  1.730 
SIZE (-) -0.082***  -7.090 -0.081***  -6.990 (+) -0.238***  -8.180 -0.244***  -8.400 
LEV (+) 0.586***  8.570 0.580***  8.470 (+) 0.091 0.520 0.128 0.730 
BETA (+) 0.168***  6.000 0.168***  6.010 (-) 0.053 0.750 0.047 0.660 
VOL (+) 0.269***  46.620 0.270***  46.730      
VOLA      (+) 1.703***  46.620 1.705***  46.730 
FOR (-) -0.001 -0.550 -0.001 -0.570 (+) 0.003 1.110 0.003 1.130 
F-VALUE  438.58***  440.29***   398.08***  399.42***  
ADJ  R-SQ  57.64% 57.73  55.25% 55.33 
1) Please refer to Table 3 for variable definitions. 
2) ***,**, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
 
Table 8. The effect of accruals quality on the association between voluntary disclosure frequency and information asymmetry 
(H4) 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴%& = 	 	𝛽* + 𝛽,𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇%&	 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑄FGH%& + 𝛽9𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇%&✕	𝐴𝑄FGH%& + 𝛽:𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸%& + 𝛽<𝐿𝐸𝑉%& + 𝛽=𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴%& +𝛽D𝑉𝑂𝐿%& + 𝛽E𝐹𝑂𝑅%& + 𝜀%&						 (3) 𝑉𝑂𝐿%& = 	 	𝛽* + 𝛽,𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇%&	 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑄FGH%& + 𝛽9𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇%&✕	𝐴𝑄FGH%& + 𝛽:𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸%& + 𝛽<𝐿𝐸𝑉%& + 𝛽=𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴%& +𝛽D𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴%& + 𝛽E𝐹𝑂𝑅%& + 𝜀%&				 (4) 
Variables Predicted Sign 
Dependent Variable VOLA Predicted 
Sign 
Dependent Variable VOL 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
INTERCEPT  4.996***  12.130 4.925***  11.950  2.829** 2.530 2.972***  2.660 
COUNT (+) 0.022**  2.330 0.029***  3.090 (-) -0.049**  -2.000 -0.057**  -2.390 
AQ1_DUM  -0.067 -1.210    -0.070 -0.490   
COUNT* 
AQ1_DUM (-) 0.002 0.130   (+) 0.044
* 1.290   
AQ2_DUM    -0.059 -1.080    0.022 0.160 
COUNT* 
AQ2_DUM (-)   -0.012 -0.920 (+)   0.065
** 1.930 
SIZE (-) -0.123***  -7.660 -0.121***  -7.490 (+) -0.192***  -4.580 -0.202***  -4.810 
LEV (+) 0.666***  6.610 0.644***  6.370 (+) 0.111 0.420 0.176 0.670 
BETA (+) 0.237***  5.840 0.239***  5.920 (-) -0.025 -0.230 -0.034 -0.320 
VOL (+) 0.251***  29.520 0.253***  29.710      
VOLA      (+) 1.666***  29.520 1.671***  29.710 
FOR (-) 0.001 -0.290 0.001 -0.300 (+) 0.001 0.280 0.001 0.350 
F-VALUE  213.84*** 215.28***  177.04*** 178.92*** 
ADJ R-SQ  58.30% 58.46%  53.62% 53.89% 
1) Please refer to Table 3 for variable definitions. 
2) ***,**, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
We empirically examine the association between voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry and then investigate 
the extent to which this association is affected by accruals quality since Korea adopted International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2011.  
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The research findings generally support our hypotheses. First, the relation between voluntary disclosure and 
information asymmetry is statistically and significantly positive as we have expected. The Korean companies with 
high voluntary disclosure would experience higher daily stock return variability and less trading volume, which 
implies that companies tend to disclose biased information to the outside, which is consistent with prior studies in 
Korea. Second, the accruals quality (moderating variable) on the relation between voluntary disclosure and 
information asymmetry is statistically and significantly negative. Thus, we can conclude that when accruals quality is 
high, more voluntary disclosure decreases information asymmetry. These findings imply that accruals quality works 
as a mechanism in reducing the negative effect of voluntary disclosure on information asymmetry after the adoption 
of IFRS in Korea.  
 
This study contributes to accounting research as it directly tests the effect of accruals quality on the relation between 
voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry in Korea, providing empirical evidence that accruals quality reduces 
the intensity of the relation between voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry. The results of this study imply 
that firms with more voluntary information enjoy reduced information asymmetry when the accruals quality is high.  
 
The limitation of this study is such that we might not have considered other omitted variables and other proxies for 
the accruals quality, voluntary disclosure, and information asymmetry. 
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